Two Siblings: Korea–Japan, The Cultural And The Sustainability of Cooperation

Introduction

In 2019, bilateral relations reached their nadir as historical and political conflicts spilled over into economic relations, private exchanges, and security cooperation. In response to Japan’s export restrictions on key semiconductor materials, South Korea boycotted Japanese products. Both official and private interactions between the two nations were significantly strained, creating a multifaceted crisis in their relationship.

However, the period after the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic ushered in an unexpected shift in Korea–Japan relations. While historical and political tensions persisted, new dynamics began to emerge, signaling the potential for change. The anti-Japan boycott of 2019, juxtaposed with the rapid recovery in Korean tourism to Japan in 2023—culminating in a historic high of 8.81 million Korean visitors in 2024—illustrates the dramatic transformation in bilateral exchanges in a remarkably short period. This paradoxical shift, in which cultural exchanges flourished despite unresolved political tensions, demands a closer examination, especially of the factors driving this change.

This study argues that the recent transformation in Korea–Japan relations can be understood through a network paradigm, with a particular focus on cultural connectivity. The strengthening of cultural ties, especially among younger generations in both countries, has emerged as a critical factor in fostering resilience against external shocks. Younger Koreans and Japanese, unburdened by any direct experience of the colonial era and shaped by shared experiences in advanced capitalist democracies, are increasingly forging connections on the basis of commonalities rather than historical antagonisms. This generational shift has ignited a possibility of moving beyond the entrenched victim (Korea)–offender (Japan) dichotomy, creating new avenues for collaboration and mutual understanding.

At the same time, many issues, such as the legal controversy surrounding the liquidation of Japanese corporate assets, differing perceptions of historical events, maritime boundary disputes involving the Joint Development Zone, rising conservatism in Japanese society, and broader geopolitical shifts during the Trump–Xi Jinping era, continue to pose challenges. These factors highlight the fragility of the relationship and underscore the importance of examining how cultural and generational shifts may contribute to long-term stability and resilience in bilateral ties.

Despite unresolved historical conflicts, exchanges and cooperation between Japan and South Korea have expanded across various fields in recent times, as several factors have contributed to a shift in mutual perceptions. The increasing necessity for bilateral cooperation on the international stage underscores the willingness of both governments to engage in collaboration (Jo Reference Jo2024; Easley Reference Easley2023b; Lee Reference Lee2022). In addition, a growing body of research has examined the role of public engagement and cultural exchange in shaping bilateral relations, including the recent improvement in Japan–Korea relations (Chun Reference Chun2019, Reference Chun2023; Easley Reference Easley2023a; Han Reference Han2020). For example, the widespread popularity of the Korean Wave (Hallyu) has the potential to positively influence the relationship, fostering mutual understanding and cooperation through cultural diplomacy (Han Reference Han2020).

While shifts in government strategy are frequently cited as the primary drivers of the recent changes in Korea–Japan relations, this study focuses on the long-term impact of cultural exchange between the two nations. By emphasizing sociocultural factors rather than state-level diplomacy, this research seeks to elucidate the underlying mechanisms shaping public perceptions in both countries. Specifically, it examines how younger generations perceive Japan–Korea relations, highlighting the resilience of cultural factors in shaping long-term bilateral dynamics. Furthermore, by analyzing the evolving patterns of cultural engagement, this study provides insights into the future trajectory of Japan–Korea relations.

The study also explores the increasing cultural connectivity between Japan and South Korea, shaped by individual engagements with cultural products, practices, and experiences. Cultural connectivity refers to the ways in which individuals construct their identities in relation to the cultural content they consume. This phenomenon is evident in cultural consumption patterns, which are shaped by personal preferences, tastes, and choices, reflecting broader affiliations, values, and lifestyles. Recognizing the role of culture in shaping self-perception and intergroup relations, this research underscores how cultural consumption fosters social identities and contributes to a deeper sense of shared belonging. By examining these dynamics, it highlights the significance of cultural exchange in strengthening bilateral ties beyond the realm of state diplomacy.

Thus, this study examines the evolution of cultural exchanges between Japan and South Korea, particularly after the pandemic, and explores their implications for the broader bilateral relationship. It highlights how cultural connectivity, particularly among Generation Z, has played a pivotal role in reshaping mutual perceptions and fostering mid- to long-term resilience. In the following sections, we examine the differences in the recent bilateral relations and analyze the current state of Korea–Japan relations among Generation Z, including their mutual perceptions and the impact of cultural exchanges. Next, we investigate the changing sense of identity among younger generations in both countries and its causes. The article concludes by identifying cultural connectivity as a source of resilience capable of mitigating conflicts and supporting the sustainable development of Korea–Japan relations.

Recent changes in Korea–Japan relations

Significant shifts and persistent tensions

Over the past 80 years, Korea–Japan relations have experienced significant shifts, shaped by periods of cooperation and persistent tensions rooted in unresolved historical issues. The end of World War II brought Japan’s defeat and Korea’s liberation from 35 years of Japanese colonial rule. While this pivotal moment signified the end of Japanese imperialism in Korea, it left unaddressed numerous issues, such as historical grievances and territorial disputes, setting the stage for complexity in bilateral relations.

In 1951, the San Francisco Peace Treaty formally ended Japan’s war and established Japan’s postwar international status. However, this treaty did little to address Korea–Japan relations, leaving historical grievances and territorial disputes unresolved. It was not until 1965 that the two countries normalized diplomatic ties with the Treaty on Basic Relations. This agreement laid the foundation for bilateral relations, with Japan providing economic aid to South Korea. Despite this progress, the treaty failed to fully reconcile historical issues, which continued to spark controversy.Footnote ¹

The fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II in 1995 marked an important moment for Japan’s reflection on its wartime actions. Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi issued the “Murayama Statement,” expressing deep remorse and heartfelt apology for Japan’s colonial rule and wartime aggression. This statement set the stage for improved relations, leading to the 1998 Kim Dae-jung-Obuchi Keizō Joint Declaration. In this historic agreement, Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi offered a formal apology for Japan’s past actions, while South Korean President Kim emphasized the need for mutual cooperation and a forward-looking partnership.

However, tensions resurfaced during significant anniversaries. In 2005, the sixtieth anniversary of World War II was overshadowed by disputes over history textbooks and territorial claims, including Dokdo.Footnote ² In 2012 (Heisei 24), South Korean President Lee Myung-bak’s visit to Dokdo intensified diplomatic friction, symbolizing the intractability of territorial issues in the bilateral relationship.

The seventieth anniversary of World War II in 2015, coinciding with the fiftieth anniversary of diplomatic normalization, brought renewed attempts at reconciliation. South Korea and Japan reached a bilateral agreement on the “comfort women” issue, with Japan offering an official apology and financial contributions to a foundation for survivors. However, the agreement was met with widespread criticism in both countries for failing to adequately consult victims and for its lack of legal accountability, underscoring the complexity of addressing historical grievances.

Although historical grievances remain a key factor in Korea–Japan relations, they do not fully account for the complexity of the bilateral dynamic. South Korea’s rapid industrial growth—partly modeled on Japan’s trajectory but shaped by its unique social and economic conditions—positioned it as a strong competitor in sectors such as automobiles and electronics by the 1990s. This rise coincided with renewed attention to unresolved historical issues, as former comfort women came forward and the fiftieth anniversary of Japan’s defeat and Korea’s liberation reignited debates over memory and responsibility. These economic and historical developments unfolded simultaneously, revealing their mutual entanglement.

The period from 2018 to 2019 witnessed a significant deterioration in bilateral relations. South Korea’s Supreme Court ruled that Japanese companies must compensate victims of forced labor during the colonial era, prompting Japan to impose export restrictions on materials critical to South Korea’s semiconductor industry. These measures escalated economic and diplomatic tensions, demonstrating the enduring influence of historical issues on contemporary relations.

In 2023, a renewed effort to repair bilateral ties emerged with the resumption of shuttle diplomacy. High-level exchanges between the leaders of South Korea and Japan signaled a shared recognition of the need to address historical disputes while fostering cooperation in the face of regional and global challenges. This development reflects a cautious yet hopeful step toward reconciliation.

Figure 1 illustrates the changes in the Japanese people’s favorability toward South Korea in response to the fluctuations in bilateral relations. The evolution of the relationship reflects the enduring impact of history and the ongoing struggle to balance cooperation with unresolved grievances in the midst of close-knit economic relations. While progress has been made, the journey toward true reconciliation continues.

Figure 1: Trends in favorable attitudes toward South Korea in Japan (1978–2024).

Source: Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2025.

The rising prominence of Korean culture in Japan

Following the deterioration of the Korea–Japan relationship in 2019, physical exchanges were also cut off due to the pandemic. However, cultural exchanges continued online, and the number of spaces to consume Korean culture increased in places such as Shin-Okubo and Osaka, making the consumption of culture relatively more active and noticeable.

According to a survey conducted by the Japanese Cabinet in October 2024, 56.3% of Japanese respondents said they felt an intimacy with Korea, while 43% said they did not (Cabinet Office 2025). This reveals an improvement after a low point in 2019 (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: Survey on the favorability of Korea and importance of Korea–Japan relations.

Source: Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2025.

Regarding the question, “Do you think the current relationship between Japan and Korea is good overall?”, 51.2% answered, “I think it is good,” and 45.8% said, “I do not think it is good.” Regarding the question, “Do you think the future development of Japan–Korea relations is important for both countries and the Asia-Pacific region?”, 74% answered, “I think it is important,” and 22.9% said, “I do not think it is important.” Compared with the results of the 2019 survey, the proportion of those who thought “it is important” rose from 57.5% to 74% (Figure 2).

For the survey results by the Japanese Cabinet on the favorability toward Korea, the response by each generation is interesting. The 18–29 year olds especially appear to have a higher affinity for Korea than other generations or the overall average (Figure 3);Footnote ³ indeed, the increased favorable feelings toward Korea among young people may have raised the overall favorability toward Korea in Japan. The small increase in positive responses toward Korea since 2020 is at least partially due to this reason.

Figure 3: Response by gender and generation.

Source: Cabinet Office, Government of Japan 2025.

What is the source of this increased favorability? The distinct trend exhibited by Japan’s Generation Z, deeply interwoven with Korean cultural content that has garnered international attention, offers some insights. In the “Japan’s Words of 2021” list announced by JiyūKokumin Sha, the publisher of “Basic Knowledge on Contemporary Terminology,” keywords reflecting Japan’s social changes and the popularity of Korean culture, such as “Generation Z,” “gender equality,” and “Squid Game,” were featured among the top 10 words.

Cultural content raises Korea’s status in Japan and the interest in culture leads to interest in Korea. The East Asia Institute (EAI) in Korea and the Genron NPO in Japan conducted a survey of about 1,000 Korean and Japanese citizens about the other country’s popular culture.Footnote ⁴ In South Korea, 17.2% in 2022 and 18.5% in 2023 said they enjoy Japanese culture, while in Japan, 34.6% in 2022 and 36.1% in 2023 said they enjoy Korean culture. In Korea, they enjoy Japanese manga and anime, and in Japan, they are highly interested in Korean music and dramas. Among these respondents, 81.3% in 2022 and 61.8% in 2023 in South Korea and 86.2% in 2022 and 89.2% in 2023 in Japan said that enjoying culture increases their favorability toward the other country. Regarding whether deteriorating relations affect the consumption of the other country’s pop culture, 47.3% of respondents in South Korea indicated that they would hesitate to consume pop culture from the other country if relations worsened. In contrast, in Japan, 53.7% responded that they would continue to enjoy the other country’s pop culture regardless of deteriorating relations. This suggests that Japan in particular holds a more positive perception of Korean culture and is less sensitive to external factors influencing the consumption of pop culture. Overall, we can see that people who enjoy culture have more positive perceptions of the other country, especially in Japan.

By generation, the rate of Korean pop culture consumption was also significantly higher among the younger generation, mainly the 18–29 year olds, than in any other generation (Figure 4). Although many people answered that they did not enjoy the pop culture of the other country, 41.5% of the 18–29 year olds in Korea and 45.6–46.9% of the 18–39 year olds in Japan responded positively. In addition, consumption of the other’s pop culture tended to lead to respondents’ improved (or positive) impressions of the other country.

Figure 4: Pop culture consumption and impression of other countries (by generation).

Source: East Asia Institute 2021.

Japan’s consumption of Korean culture has a reciprocal impact on Korea. In Korea, the number of consumers of Japanese pop culture, such as animation, is increasing, and 77.9% of Japanese pop culture consumers have said that it enhances their impression of Japan (EAI 2024).

Interest in cultural content can serve as a catalyst for improving perceptions of the other country, just as shifts in public sentiment can pave the way for greater cultural engagement. Media such as Korean dramas or Japanese anime often spark curiosity and empathy, gradually reshaping attitudes. Conversely, changing political and social climates can foster more positive emotions, which in turn encourage cultural exchange. However, online discourse around sensitive issues—such as the Dokdo/Takeshima territorial remarks or Japan’s denial of wartime responsibility—has frequently reignited anti-Japanese or anti-Korean sentiment. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, hate speech and nationalist rhetoric on internet forums often exacerbated these emotions, undoing previous efforts at reconciliation. More recently, however, a shift has become evident. Korean pop culture has been warmly received in Japan, while Japanese media content enjoys growing popularity among Korean youth, helping to build more positive emotional ties. Notably, even Japanese enka musicFootnote ⁵ is now being featured on South Korean television, often met not with resistance but with emotional resonance—particularly among older viewers, who express empathy and connection rather than hostility. This increasing openness to cultural exchange across generations and genres reflects a meaningful transformation in the emotional landscape of Korea–Japan relations, suggesting that cultural interaction plays a vital role in easing historical tensions.

The growth of Japanese tourism among Koreans

Figure 5 reveals a fascinating dynamic in Korea–Japan relations, particularly in the interplay between public sentiment and tourism trends. While Japanese public perception of South Korea experienced a significant decline after 2012, marked by a surge in negative views, the number of South Korean visitors to Japan simultaneously increased at a remarkable rate.

Figure 5: Trends in the number of foreign visitors to Japan by country/region (yearly data).

Source: JNTO(Japan National Tourism Organization) 2025.

From 2012 onward, South Korean tourism in Japan grew substantially, ranking second only to China in terms of inbound visitors by 2019. This trend can be attributed to several factors, including the proliferation of low-cost carriers, cultural appeal of Japanese cuisine and shopping, and geographic proximity that facilitated convenient travel. Despite deteriorating bilateral relations at the political level, individual-level tourism thrived, underscoring the distinct separation between state-level tensions and people-to-people exchanges.

However, this steady growth was disrupted in 2019 when bilateral relations worsened due to diplomatic and economic tensions, mainly around historical grievances and Japan’s export restrictions. These developments sparked a widespread movement in South Korea to boycott Japanese goods and travel, leading to a sharp decline in South Korean visitors. The COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 further compounded this decline, as international travel was severely restricted.

A notable development in the post-pandemic period was the rapid recovery in South Korean tourism in Japan. By 2023, South Koreans became the largest group of inbound visitors to Japan, and in 2024, an all-time record was set with 8.81 million visits. This trend persisted following the governmental changes in both countries in 2025, reflecting a continued recognition of the importance of Korea–Japan cooperation. In particular, sustained people-to-people exchanges have been frequently cited as a key rationale for maintaining and strengthening amicable bilateral relations, underscoring tourism as a resilient channel of cultural and economic interaction under a pragmatic, national-interest-oriented diplomatic framework.

From hierarchical to equally positioned relations

At the time of normalization of diplomatic relations in 1965, the national economic power gap between Japan and Korea was about 31 to 1 (World Bank 2025). Since 2017, Korea has been ahead of Japan in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP).Footnote⁶ During the 30 years of Japan’s economic downturn since 1990, the Korean economy has grown dramatically, particularly in the cultural and creative industries, and has demonstrated a high level of competitiveness. In terms of security alliances, both countries are seen to be on equal footing. On the basis of these figures, what used to be a vertical relationship between Korea and Japan in the past is now transitioning to a horizontal relationship in terms of economy, military, and culture.

This change in relationship may be unfamiliar and sometimes objectionable to the older generations in Japan, while the younger generation neutrally accepts the elevated status of a developed Korea. The older generation in Korea, which traditionally perceived Japan as a significantly more advanced nation, has recently begun to reassess this view through firsthand experiences. Benefiting from the weak yen and affordable prices, they have traveled to Japan and observed the similarities in the economic conditions. These structural changes in the economic status of the two countries are particularly significant as they influence mutual perceptions. This shift is expected to foster a more balanced and equitable relationship, allowing for the sharing of comparable challenges and experiences, positive or negative. Furthermore, it highlights the commonalities in how both nations perceive and respond to the uncertainties of the evolving global order. Importantly, these changes transcend quantitative economic indicators, reflecting a transformation in perception on the basis of stronger cultural connections and shared experiences.

As the countries mark the eightieth anniversary of the end of World War II and the sixtieth anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan, the occasion presents an opportune moment to examine the structural and cultural transformations underpinning Korea–Japan relations and provide a basis for discussing the future trajectory of bilateral relations.

Cultural connectivity in Korea–Japan relations

Shifts in worldview and shared interests

The perceptions of Japanese and South Koreans, which have gradually improved since reaching a nadir in 2019, can be attributed to increased exchanges and shared experiences. Heightened concerns about perceived threats from North Korea, coupled with intensified online and offline interactions and experiences with Japan, have fostered a closer relationship between the two countries. In the network society, people recognize the world with customized news and facts through online platforms, such as YouTube, Instagram, Facebook etc. They build a self-surrounding world and figure out their interests and relations with others.

According to the survey by EAI and Genron NPO (2023), North Korea, China, and Japan are the top three countries that South Koreans perceive as military threats, and North Korea, China, and Russia are the top three countries that Japan perceives as military threats. The threat perception of North Korea is the highest in both South Korea and Japan, and it is increasing. South Korea perceives Japan as a threat, but at a gradually decreasing rate, from 33.2% in 2022 to 28.9% in 2023. Japan does not perceive South Korea as a threat, a significant difference between the two countries.

Since 2010, China has become the world’s second largest economy, overtaking Japan. As China’s rise became clearer, the perception of China as a threat, as well as conflicts arising from systemic differences with China, began to appear. Sino–Japanese territorial conflict over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) controversy, the ban of Korean contents in China, and anti-Korea sentiments that led to worsening South Korea–China relations are factors that have enhanced a negative perception about China in Japan and Korea. On social media, exchanges with China are limited due to internet censorship, search blocking, and the differences in the social media platforms used. In contrast, aspects that Korea and Japan share are increasing.

According to the Genron NPO’s survey results, the Japanese people’s favorability toward China was very low, at 9%, as of 2021. Favorability toward China has been declining continuously since 2010, hitting the lowest point at 6.8% in 2014 and still under 10% in 2024. Negative perceptions of China were also high in Korea; during the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, anger at perceived unfair decisions by the games’ judges triggered Korean protests against the results. The anger also stems from cultural attacks by China, such as the so-called kimchi project, in which some Chinese claimed kimchi, a traditionally Korean dish of fermented vegetables, to be part of Chinese culture, and the hanbok project, in which some Chinese claimed the hanbok, a traditional Korean garment, as part of Chinese culture. The younger generation’s sentiment toward China is changing to being more anti-Chinese. Being sensitive to soft power, they are voicing concerns that they can no longer tolerate China’s “cultural invasion” or “cultural distortion” on the Internet.Footnote ⁷ Meanwhile, during the Beijing Olympics, Korean athlete Lee Sang-hwa was moved to tears while cheering for Japanese speed skater Kodaira Nao—a moment that symbolized the growing sense of closeness between South Korea and Japan, especially when contrasted with the underlying tensions both countries harbored toward China.

Korean’s negative perceptions of China, which have long existed due to issues such as fine dust, yellow dust, the THAAD dispute, and the origins of the COVID-19 outbreak, erupted into active anti-China sentiment during the impeachment trial of President Yoon Suk-yeol. Rumors about China’s involvement in interfering with South Korea’s elections and stealing information led to widespread resentment and hatred toward Chinese people, with slogans such as “China Out” and “No China” emerging. There were even concerns that Chinese nationals in South Korea might need to conceal their identity as Chinese.

The use of online platforms, the major communication channels in the COVID-19 era, also highlight the differences with China. In China, they use Weibo, Bilibili, Youku, and so on, instead of Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and Netflix, all of which are familiar social network platforms in Korea and Japan. Furthermore, the differences in cultural content consumption and attitudes toward copyright issues also show the gaps in the standards and values of the international community and those of China. While the differences with China are becoming more pronounced, the similarities between Korea and Japan are growing. Furthermore, shared values—particularly liberal democratic ideals—among younger generations in Korea and Japan are becoming increasingly salient. As value-based diplomacy emphasizing universal principles such as liberal democracy, the rule of law, and human rights gains momentum, the United States, Japan, and Korea are actively seeking solidarity with like-minded countries. At the same time, this sentiment is intertwined with the international community being keen to keep a check on China’s power. Therefore, the idea of “Japan/Korea, who we share similar values with, and China, who we are on a collision course with” could well gain currency.

Regarding the United States, the strengthening of Korea–Japan–United States cultural connectivity and shared values highlights how this interconnectedness, coupled with efforts to sustain it, has played a pivotal role in international relations. This underscores the importance of cultural factors in fostering sustainable relationships in the long term.

Recent changes in the international landscape have brought South Korea and Japan closer together, simultaneously diminishing the prospect of reunification with North Korea. The similarities between South Korea and Japan are becoming increasingly pronounced compared with those between North and South Korea. In recent years, North Korea has emerged as a perceived “threat” in both South Korean and Japanese societies. Under Kim Jong-un’s leadership, North Korea has further advanced its nuclear capabilities and has conducted missile launches in directions affecting both South Korea and Japan. Moreover, conflicts such as the Russia–Ukraine war and the Israel–Palestine conflict have heightened global unpredictability and security concerns. At this critical point, the importance of cooperation, including against threats from North Korea and China, is being increasingly emphasized.

Korea and Japan have experienced various natural and social calamities, including the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami, the sinking of MV Sewol, the COVID-19 pandemic, the Seoul Halloween crowd crush, the Noto Peninsula earthquake, the Jeju Air crash, and so on. These events have significantly shaped contemporary social experiences in both countries by heightening public awareness of safety and vulnerability in emergency situations. Consequently, issues of disaster preparedness and risk management have gained prominence, often taking precedence over peacetime concerns. Such shared experiences also highlight the importance of developing common guidelines and strengthening international cooperation to respond effectively to large-scale crises.

In this era, Koreans and Japanese are devising strategies to counter the threats posed by international tensions and unexpected disasters. Simultaneously, the worldviews and interests of the younger generation, who are more familiar with the similarities between Japan and Korea than with their relationships with China and North Korea, are being shaped by their global experiences and shared perceptions.

Values expressed through cultural actions

Due to the memory of colonial rule, Japanese culture was considered a “taboo” in Korea in the postwar period. Japanese culture officially became accessible only after the 1998 Kim-Obuchi Joint Declaration.Footnote⁸ Before the Korean market opened up to Japanese pop culture in the 1990s, there were deep concerns about neo-colonialism and that Korean culture might be eroded by Japanese culture. The Korean government’s 1998 report on opening up to Japanese culture emphasized, “It is important to learn how to overcome the limitations of Korean broadcasting, which previously merely imitated Japanese broadcasting.”

However, at the time of the actual opening up to popular culture, the “Korean Wave” phenomenon began to appear. From 1997, Korean dramas and music began to gain popularity in China and Taiwan, and in the 2000s, the Korean Wave reached Japan. Between 2003 and 2004, the Korean drama Winter Sonata led the Korean Wave boom in Japan.

For the generation who were children in the 2000s, Japanese animation forms a large part of their childhood memories. The big studio Japanese animations that aired on Korean TV from the 2000s include Dodgeball King Tonki, Pocket Monster, Slam Dunk, Dragon Ball Z, Sailor Moon, Naruto, Inuyasha, and One Piece. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the younger generation had more exposure to Japanese manga than Korean manhwa.

The Pokémon Bread craze in Korea can be understood as a reenactment of childhood memories among a younger generation that grew up consuming Pokémon characters. Limited supply contributed to distinctive consumer behavior, including long queues and purchases at prices several times higher than the original. Collecting the stickers included with the bread also became a widespread practice, with rare items traded at high prices. For many consumers, the revival of personal memories and experiences took precedence over considerations of national origin, including the fact that Pokémon is a Japanese animation.

In addition, the Japanese animated film Suzume, directed by Shinkai Makoto and released in South Korea in March 2023, achieved notable commercial success, attracting more than five million viewers and generating over KRW 56 billion in revenue (Korean Film Council 2023). Alongside this, many millennials in South Korea have shown a tendency to revisit childhood memories shaped by their engagement with Japanese popular culture. This is evident in consumption practices related to the Pokémon sticker trend and the renewed popularity of “The First Slam Dunk.” This movie, based on a basketball-themed manga from the 1990s, was released as a film after 30 years, evoking nostalgia among the Korean millennial generation and sparking a retro craze. With the popularization of the meme “What matters is never giving up,” it appealed to younger audiences in their teens and twenties, contributing to the rise of the “newtro” trend.

Many people, along with their families, entrusted their precious photos to ChatGPT and requested that they be transformed into Ghibli style. While various image transformations were possible, including Disney, The Simpsons, and Pororo, there was particularly strong demand in Korea for images in the Ghibli style. People found warmth and a sense of “healing” in the Ghibli-style versions of their photos and experienced satisfaction in the idealized yet realistic images that resemble live-action, often setting them as profile pictures to represent their identities. On KakaoTalk, “Ghibli-style profile pictures” circulated widely.

The meaning behind “Ghibli-style profile pictures” was multifaceted. However, when considered in relation to familiarity with Japanese animation, this phenomenon suggested a reduced level of resistance toward Japanese culture. In this sense, it reflected a shift in Korea–Japan relations in 2025, contrasting with earlier periods when Japanese cultural products were more readily rejected or labeled as “pro-Japanese.”

Thus, in the context of the cultural exchange between Korea and Japan, the favorability/unfavourability of the content itself appears to be becoming a more significant factor than its country of origin. With increasing access to Japanese culture and the global spread of the Korean Wave, foreign cultural exchanges became more common among Koreans. In the process, Japanese culture is gradually being perceived less as a distinct or exceptional entity and more as one among many foreign cultures. Rather than focusing on the nationality of the content, the younger generation’s affinity and preference for the content itself are emerging as key determinants of cultural consumption. This evolving attitude suggests a growing tendency to view cultural products independently of national origin, which may in turn contribute to easing long-standing negative sentiments or animosity toward Japan in the future. While the younger generation tends to engage with cultural content primarily on the basis of personal affinity rather than national origin, this very sense of affinity—formed through repeated and positive engagement—can over time extend beyond the content itself to shape perceptions of the producing country. In this way, content-driven consumption that initially appears nationality-neutral is nonetheless grounded in emotional receptivity, which may eventually contribute to improving the broader image of the nation associated with the culture.

Korea’s Generation Z, who grew up unaware of the Japanese cultural import ban, naturally encountered and consumed Japanese content without past memories. They are digitally savvy and attempt to find their own identity through social media. They express political and social messages, as well as construct their identities, through acts of consumption—seeking not only outcomes, but also meaning and value in the process itself. However, the characteristics of the social media generation, which is sensitive to cultural content, do not appear only in a direction that is friendly to the other country. As private exchanges between Japan and Korea have increased, unpleasant experiences, such as reports of Japanese restaurants that provided sushi full of wasabi only to Koreans or store clerks who seem to look down on Korean customers, quickly spread through social media. Increased private exchanges brought some negative experiences, and cases that might negatively affect mutual favorability have surfaced.

Korea’s boycott of Japanese products, during the worst phase of the Korea–Japan relationship starting in 2019, can also be explained in the context of the cultural consumption of the younger generation. Since they express themselves through consumption, they are sending a political and social message by “not consuming” and disconnectedness. The MZ generation promoted the boycott on social media and used it as a platform to communicate their beliefs. “Meaning-out consumption,” which is a reflection of resisting unfair measures by the Japanese government, was in action.

When looking at whether the deterioration of relations between Japan and South Korea would affect consumption of the other country’s culture, about 47% of respondents in South Korea said they would slow down their consumption, while in Japan, 64.6% of respondents in 2021, 61% in 2022, and 53.7% in 2023 said they would continue to consume regardless of the deterioration of relations. The influence of Korean pop culture consumption is particularly strong in Japan (EAI 2021, 2022, 2023).

As Korean culture is recognized around the world, interest in Korean cultural content is growing. Many young Japanese and Koreans support Bangtan Boys, popularly known as BTS, as “army” fans regardless of nationality. Additionally, there has been active support for many K-pop artists, especially in Japan, where the phenomenon known as “Oshikatsu” has emerged prominently. This involves not only the active consumption of the artists’ work and related products, but also watching and engaging with their background and growth stories, sharing in their lives and values. This indicates a multifaceted and complex fandom phenomenon, where individuals connect their admiration for their favorite artists with their own identity.

In 2022, Hirokazu Kore-eda, a Japanese director, made the film Broker with Korean actors Kang-ho Song, Doona Bae, Dong-won Kang, and Ji-eun Lee; Song even won the Best Actor Award at Cannes. Although it is classified as a Korean movie, the trust between a Japanese director and Korean actors and the movie’s global recognition demonstrates that a consensus is being built around culture rather than each other’s nationality.

Moreover, the Korean television series Crash Landing on You was a sensation in Japan during the COVID-19 pandemic, and Korean films such as Parasite and series such as Squid Game won global awards and achieved widespread popularity, including in Japan. Such cultural recognition not only enhanced Korean national pride, but also bolstered Korea’s soft power, helping it to overcome the historical complexities and traumas associated with its colonial past.

Until the 2000s, Korea had an asymmetric and one-sided structure with respect to Japanese cultural consumption. However, the success of Korean cultural content in Japan, which brought forward the fourth Korean Wave, has changed the cultural consumption structures in both countries symmetrically and mutually. The first Korean wave appeared with the success of Korean dramas such as Winter Sonata, and the second wave was when K-pop idols entered the Japanese market. The third Korean wave formed when idol groups made up of members from both Korea and Japan debuted online and exchanges through social media became active. The fourth Korean wave formed with the advent of at-home work and more time spent at home due to COVID-19. Consequently, users of streaming services such as Netflix increased, and access to Korean dramas became easier. In 2021, 7 of the top 11 programs in Japan’s annual TV program rankings were Korean dramas, showing their popularity.

The popularity of K-pop, led by BTS, continues. As of January 2, 2022, the cumulative sales of BTS, The Best album exceeded 1.2 million copies. The album, released in Japanese, topped the Oricon charts. In December 2021 and January 24–28, 2022, “BTS My Best, Request” was broadcast live on Nippon Broadcasting every night at 8 p.m. for 2 hours, and Japanese celebrities who liked BTS were the hosts. They introduced the songs they selected and the songs requested by the listeners. Meanwhile, NiziU, produced by Korean producer JYP, gained popularity in Japan and interest in K-pop producers and their idol training systems also increased.

Children who grew up with parents belonging to the first generation of the Korean wave were naturally exposed to Korean dramas from an early age and are more likely to take an interest in the language, or even speak it fluently. Furthermore, in the current era of Hallyu 4.0, Korean culture is acknowledged as a trend, amplifying the influence of Korean culture as a new phenomenon. This demonstrates that the impact of Korean culture varies across generations and accumulates over time. Thus, the areas where mutual cultural exchanges between Korea and Japan can be understood and shared are gradually expanding. In addition, the Gen Z, which is more sensitive to culture than to nationality, maintains a favorable impression of cultural content on the basis of their memories of Japanese animation and cultural products, which transforms into an unbiased consumption behavior toward Japan and its products.

Toward sustainable relations: overcoming historical trauma and domestic polarization

Do the increased cultural exchanges and enhanced connectivity contribute to the resilience of Korea–Japan relations? Survey responses (see Figure 4) indicate that the consumption of Korean cultural content in Japan fosters positive perceptions of Korea. Moreover, the 2024 EAI survey data confirm that Korean visits to Japan and the consumption of Japanese popular culture are associated with more favorable views of Japan among Koreans (Table 2).

Table 1 Top 5 foreign visitors to Japan in 2024

Source: JNTO 2025.

Table 2 South Korea’s favorability toward Japan

Note: Coefficients are reported with their t-values in parentheses.

Significance levels: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.

“–” indicates that the variable was not included in that model.

Source: Results of Ordinal Logistic Regression Analysis on South Korea’s Perceptions of Japan (Sohn Reference Sohn2024).

Table 2 presents that South Korea’s favorability toward Japan is significantly influenced by personal experiences and perceptions. Visiting Japan and engaging with Japanese popular culture are consistently associated with higher favorability with strong statistical significance, highlighting the crucial role of cultural exchange in shaping public attitudes. In addition to cultural engagement, factors such as views on historical issues, perceptions of Korea–Japan economic relations, and political party affiliation also influence favorability. Notably, individuals who perceive cultural and people-to-people exchanges positively are more likely to hold favorable views, suggesting that soft power and everyday cultural contact may be more effective in improving bilateral sentiments than political or ideological alignment alone.

At the same time, the belief that resolving historical issues is essential for improving bilateral relations remains influential (Chun Reference Chun2019). Korea’s ability to overcome its historical identity as a victim of Japanese colonialism is critical for establishing stable future relations (Chun Reference Chun2023). Recent trends reveal that as the number of Korean visitors to Japan has increased, overall impressions of Japan have improved (Figure 7), and the increased consumption of popular culture is further enhancing these positive perceptions (Figure 8). Consequently, it is important to monitor in the medium-to-long term whether this shift in public sentiment will contribute to sustainable bilateral relations.

Figure 6: GDP per capita 1960–2024.

Source: World Bank 2025.

Figure 7: Changes in perceptions after visiting Japan Q. How has your perception of Japan changed following your visit?.

Source: Sohn 2024.

Figure 8: Influence of popular culture on perceptions of Japan Q. Do you think that popular culture improves your impression of Japan?.

Source: Sohn Reference Sohn2024.

Furthermore, recent domestic challenges in Korea may complicate the sustainable development of Korea–Japan relations. Divisions and polarization across generations, genders, and regions are intensifying. In particular, younger individuals exhibit more positive perceptions of the other country, and overall mutual perceptions tend to be more favorable among women than among men (see Figure 3). Notably, the impact of cultural consumption on perceptions is the most pronounced among women in their twenties.

The recent declaration of martial law by President Yoon Suk-yeol, accompanied by a leadership vacuum and growing social polarization, has raised concerns regarding the stability of the progress made in Korea–Japan relations over recent years. While the ongoing political crisis and debates surrounding the nation’s diplomatic achievements could pose challenges, cultural connectivity between Korea and Japan has managed to persist, especially through civilian-led exchanges both online and offline. This continuity highlights the resilience of people-to-people ties, even amid political turbulence.

As 2025 marks the sixtieth anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan, the strength of the cultural connectivity between the two nations will be tested. While historical disputes, domestic and international political uncertainty, and economic limitations continue to cloud the future of bilateral relations, the extent to which Korea and Japan can sustain and deepen their cooperation in this challenging environment remains uncertain.

Moreover, the changing geopolitical landscape, marked by the return of the Trump administration in January 2025, signals a potential reconfiguration of the East Asian international order, which has long been based on the Korea–United States and Japan–United States alliances. Both Korea and Japan are facing remarkably similar challenges as they seek to safeguard their core interests in the context of intensifying United States–China competition. As such, it is crucial for both countries to learn from each other’s policies toward the United States and China, using bilateral cooperation to navigate the uncertainties of this evolving global landscape.

Conclusions

This study offers a multifaceted overview of Korea–Japan ties, exploring the intersection of generational shifts, cultural exchanges, economic interdependence, political dynamics, and international relations. Our examination of the bilateral relationship through the lens of cultural connectivity reveals that the post-COVID era has set the stage for a more sustainable and resilient partnership. The increasing perceptual divergence from China and North Korea—whose political and ideological values starkly contrast with those of South Korea and Japan—has prompted both nations to recognize their mutual proximity in cultural and societal terms. Digital communication platforms such as Instagram, Facebook, and Netflix have facilitated connections among young Koreans and Japanese, allowing them to engage with similar content and enhance their cultural ties. Furthermore, a shared commitment to liberal democracy, the rule of law, and universal human rights, along with a growing preference for value-driven consumption, has played a pivotal role in reshaping Korea–Japan relations.

As Korea’s global influence continues to rise, largely driven by its cultural exports and the strengthening of its soft power, the relative standing between Korea and Japan is undergoing a significant recalibration. This shift has moved the relationship away from a traditional hierarchical framework, particularly in areas such as culture and the economy. The growing sense of mutual respect and friendliness, fueled by structural equality and enhanced exchanges, has deepened the cultural proximity between the two countries.

In this evolving international landscape, the relationship between Korea and Japan is no longer defined solely by historical tensions or economic rivalry. Instead, it reflects a more nuanced and multidimensional partnership that acknowledges both differences and commonalities. While tensions may still persist, they must now be understood within the broader context of a rich and dynamic bilateral relationship. Cultural connectivity, therefore, must be recognized not only as a vital force in improving relations, but also as an increasingly influential factor in shaping the future trajectory of Korea–Japan cooperation, transcending traditional political, historical, and economic discourses.

Despite historical volatility and ongoing debates over political and diplomatic achievements, cultural connectivity seems set to remain a stabilizing force between South Korea and Japan. In particular, civilian-led exchanges, both online and offline, continue to thrive, contributing to a more positive bilateral atmosphere. As the two countries approach the sixtieth anniversary of diplomatic normalization, it is imperative to reflect on the lessons of the past and examine whether this growing cultural connectivity will provide the resilience necessary to navigate future challenges. With both nations facing significant domestic challenges—such as polarization, generational divides, and gender issues—attention must be paid to how cultural connections can bridge these gaps and contribute to long-term stability.

In today’s unpredictable global environment, the sustainability of deepening cultural ties between Korea and Japan remains an important issue. Given the complex historical legacy and the fluid nature of international relations, a smooth or linear path of cooperation cannot be taken for granted. Nevertheless, recent developments suggest that the recognition of the importance of bilateral cooperation has persisted despite political transitions, with expanding people-to-people and cultural exchanges continuing to support mutual engagement. The strengthening of such cultural connectivity has the potential to enhance the resilience of bilateral relations, enabling both countries to maintain and restore normalized exchanges even amid diplomatic tensions. As transformations in the international order continue and multilayered cultural interactions deepen, these dynamics may contribute to a more sustainable and enduring Korea–Japan partnership grounded in mutual understanding, shared interests, and pragmatic cooperation.

Data availability statement

The data that support the findings of this study are openly available on the EAI website at https://eai.or.kr/press_poll.php and Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. “Opinion Poll on Diplomacy” at https://survey.gov-online.go.jp/indexgai.html

Financial support

This work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2023S1A5A2A03085570; NRF-2025S1A5A2A01005115).

Competing interests

The authors report there are no competing interests to declare.

Seunghee Oh is an assistant professor at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy. She previously served as a research professor at the Institute for Japanese Studies at Seoul National University and Korea University, as well as a principal researcher at the East Asia Institute. She has also lectured at Ewha Womans University, Korea University, and the Catholic University of Korea. Her research focuses on Sino–Japanese relations, Japan’s foreign policy, and international relations in Northeast Asia. She is the author of Struggle for Recognition in East Asia (Seoul National University Press, 2023) and “From the Only A-Bombed Country to Global Peace Advocate: Japan’s Diplomatic Identity Change in the Struggle for Recognition” (Korean Journal of International Studies, 2024), among other works.

Jahyun Chun is a professor in the Department of International Relations at Yonsei University, Mirae Campus. Her research focuses on international reconciliation, national identity, and foreign policy decision-making in East Asia, with a particular emphasis on the role of historical memory and collective trauma. She is the editor of the Journal of Regional Studies and Development. Chun’s recent work, published in leading journals such as Pacific Affairs, International Relations, and Policy Studies, includes “Understanding Mistrust and Instability in East Asia” (2022), “Varieties of International Reconciliation” (2022), and “Who Decides Foreign Policy? The Role of National Trauma in Shaping the Influence of Public Opinion in South Korea” (2021). Her interdisciplinary approach bridges political science, history, and foreign policy to address complex issues of trust and memory in international politics.

Footnotes

¹ In the aftermath of its defeat in World War II, Japan faced severe economic hardship, but the outbreak of the Korean War provided a timely boost. U.S. military procurement during the conflict offered much-needed stimulus, aiding Japan’s early postwar recovery. Meanwhile, South Korea remained under authoritarian rule until the 1980s, and the reparations Japan provided after the 1965 normalization agreement were ambiguously defined. Instead of reaching individuals affected by colonial rule, these funds were absorbed into state-led development programs that disproportionately benefited large conglomerates. This uneven distribution of reparations has left many victims without recognition or compensation, deepening long-standing historical grievances and shaping contemporary perceptions of justice in both countries.

² Dokdo (called Takeshima in Japanese) is a group of islands in the East Sea that is administered by South Korea, which maintains that it is its sovereign territory and not subject to any territorial dispute, while Japan claims the islands as its own territory.

³ In this figure, gender-based differences are also prominent, with women tending to perceive Japan–South Korea relations more positively, potentially demonstrating greater openness to intercultural influences. While this observation requires further empirical investigation, the present study limits its discussion of gender to noting its significance, with a more detailed analysis of generational differences.

⁴ EAI and Genron NPO have surveyed mutual perceptions by conducting one-on-one, face-to-face interviews using paper questionnaires over approximately 17–20 days around May and June each year, with 1,000 adult men and women aged 18 years and over nationwide. The sample of 1,000 was randomly selected after proportional allocation by gender, age, and region according to the resident registration population, with a maximum allowable sampling error of ±3.1 percentage points at a 95% confidence level.

⁵ Enka is a genre of Japanese popular music whose musical style has often been noted for its similarities to Korean trot, a genre that likewise emphasizes emotional expression and melodic sentiment. When enka began to circulate in South Korea, some observers anticipated public sensitivity due to its association with Japanese popular culture and the historical context of Japan’s colonial rule; however, such concerns have gradually evolved alongside increasing cultural interaction and changing patterns of reception.

⁶ In terms of nominal gross domestic product (GDP), Japan leads Korea with its large population, but in terms of the PPP, which is an “indicator of abundance” where one can compare actual individual living standards, Korea started to lead Japan in 2017. Japan’s nominal GDP was 23.4 times that of Korea in the 1970s, 16.9 times in the 1980s, 11.2 times in 1990, and 3.1 times in 2018; the gap has been steadily closing. Japan’s GDP PPP was 12.3 times of Korea’s in the 1980s, 7.5 times in the 1990s, 4.4 times in the 2000s, 3 times in 2010, and 2.6 times in 2018; the gap has steadily decreased here as well (IMF 2018).

⁷ A notable example is the controversy surrounding the mobile game “shining Nikki,” which removed hanbok-inspired content following backlash from Chinese users, prompting strong criticism from Korean players. On the YouTube channel “Shiyin Official,” a heated debate broke out in the comments section over hanbok, while similarly intense and sensitive exchanges occurred on channels where kimchi was portrayed as a Chinese dish.

⁸ This is officially known as the “Japan-South Korea Joint Declaration: A new Japan–Korea Partnership towards the Twenty-first Century” and was adopted on October 8, 1998. Japanese Prime Minister Keizō Obuchi and South Korean President Kim Dae-jung reaffirmed friendly relations between Japan and South Korea and pledged to cooperate to build a new Japan–South Korea partnership. South Korea decided to allow Japanese cultural imports (music, animation, movies, books, etc.).

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Source: Cambridge University